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Abstract
In July 2001, Party Secretary Jiang Zemin announced that private entrepreneurs,
among other 'outstanding' representatives of the new social elites, were welcome
to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The move led to controversial
ideological debates as it was widely interpreted as a clear signal that the communist
party was finally turning capitalist. Things become less clear, however, when we
look not so much at ideologies but at the actual facts. Realizing how little we
know about the reality of relations between the CCP and private entrepreneurs,
the aim of the paper is two-fold: The first is to collect and critically assess the
information available on current developments of the 'private economy' (a vague
notion in itself), and on the proportion of entrepreneurs who are already CCP
members. Second, based on this analytical 'deconstruction' of statistical data and
categories, the article delineates motives and strategies that might lie behind the
new policy of formally admitting private entrepreneurs into the party. As will be
argued, one important reason could be that the CCP, by co-opting entrepreneurs,
attempts to (re-)gain access to the ever larger labour force employed in the growing
non-public sector of the economy and thus to strengthen its organizational
presence at the grassroots level. However, while we know something about the
CCP's policy, much more needs to be known about the political preferences,
attitudes and behaviour of private entrepreneurs. Therefore, instead of drawing
macropolitical conclusions, the paper ends with an outline of relevant microscopic
aspects of the relations between entrepreneurs and the CCP that deserve more in-
depth analysis in the future.
Admitting Private Entrepreneurs Into the CCP: Does It
Make a Difference?
In his now legendary speech of 1 July 2001, to mark the Chinese Com-
munist Party's 80th anniversary, Party Secretary Jiang Zemin announced
that the CCP would open its doors wide to admit 'outstanding elements'
from the 'new social strata'. Many observers were surprised by the ideo-
logically acrobatic speech which was purported in the international press
to signify a eulogized invitation of private entrepreneurs into the CCP.
Particularly in Western countries, the step was interpreted as a heart-
ened acknowledgement by the communist party leadership that the
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country had finally found its way home back into the capitalist world.
Strong criticism voiced by alleged 'hardliners' such as Deng Liqun and
others who accused Jiang Zemin of betraying the CCP by admitting 'capi-
talists' and 'exploiters'  seemed to confirm that this indeed represented a
major breakthrough in the party's ideological and organizational design.1
Conventional wisdom had it that the party leadership finally had
decided to acknowledge the enormous contributions of the private sec-
tor and to broaden its own social base by representing the interests not
only of the 'proletariat' but also of the new social elites. This move was
said to aim at preventing the defection of a new bourgeois middle class,
pre-empting the emergence of a potential political opposition and bol-
stering the power of the one-party state. With this 'revolutionary' step,
Jiang Zemin was seen to have created a personal hallmark that would
stand out in party history before handing over the reins to the next
generation of leaders.
However, when the moment of surprise was over, observers who
looked more closely at the event had to realize that the admittance of
entrepreneurs into the party was, after all, not such a new thing. In fact,
quite a number of private entrepreneurs seem to have joined the party
before, indicating that the CCP doors had actually been open to this
group for a while already. As Jiang Zemin's proposal is going to be
enshrined officially as the CCP's new policy, it seems worthwhile to
test the conventional assumptions and to ask whether it really does
make a difference, and, if so, what kind of difference.
To address this question, this paper first seeks to analyse in some
depth the various statistical categories and numbers to elucidate the
not so clear-cut notions of 'private entrepreneur', 'private enterprise',
'private sector', etc. A second section will piece together the informa-
tion we have about CCP membership among various kinds of entre-
preneurs. Based on these findings, a third section will then discuss vari-
ous motives and strategies which may be behind the decision of the
party to admit private entrepreneurs, and their implications for repre-
senting the interests and political participation of the new economic
elites. Here, ideological, financial and organizational aspects will be
taken into account. It will be suggested that, although there are serious
ideological barriers to the inclusion of 'capitalists' into the party, the
move can be seen as a rational organizational strategy to secure the
CCP's status as 'vanguard of the working class' – albeit with an ex-
tended definition of the term. Yet, the main goal of this paper is not to
answer questions but to identify relevant new questions and analytical
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topics which could or should be addressed in future research on the
relations between the party and private entrepreneurs.
Deconstructing the Private Sector: Categories and Numbers
 At first glance, it seems quite clear what is meant by the 'private sector'
in China. As the English language service of Xinhua reported in April
2002, 'the share of the private sector in China's GDP has reached 33
percent, a little lower than the 37 percent of the state-owned economy'.2
Unfortunately, as is the case in many English media reports, a defini-
tion of the 'private sector' or of 'private enterprise' is not given.
Traditionally, PRC statistics used to differentiate four sectors of the
economy by the criterion of ownership of the means of production,
namely the state-owned, the collective, the private and the foreign-
funded. Among them, the category 'private' was always the hardest to
define. In the Chinese language, the term that comes closest to 'private
enterprise' is siying qiye, a notion that was sanctioned for official use in
1988 to signify enterprises with privately owned assets employing at
least eight people. The latter criterion was to distinguish them from the
smaller geti gongshanghu (getihu), the 'single industrial and commercial
proprietors' or 'self-employed entrepreneurs' who employ less than eight
persons and do not represent formal enterprises in the sense of legal
entities. Together, these two categories form the core entities of what is
understood as the 'private sector' proper, reported to comprise more
than 20 percent of China's GDP.3  These 'private entrepreneurs' are still
today often imagined as rural and urban self-made men, stereotypically
lowly educated but with lots of entrepreneurial wit who have braved
the storms of the emerging Chinese market economy.
Statistical numbers for the private enterprises (siying qiye) are the most
unambiguous and easy to access. According to official statistics, at the
end of 2000, 1.76 million siying qiye were registered across the country,
employing 24.06 million persons.4  The most recent figure reported for
the end of 2001 is 2.03 million private enterprises, an increase which
continues the rapid growth trend of the 1990s when the number of pri-
vate enterprises on average increased by 35 percent per year (see fig-
ures below).5  Concerning the numbers of self-employed individuals
(getihu), official statistics reported a decrease over the past two years:
While the number of registered getihu had been growing steadily over
the past two decades to reach 31 million in 1999, the figure decreased to
25.71 million at the end of 2000, and further to 24.23 million at the end
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of 2001.6  This reversal of the trend – which seems to be caused by a
technical change in statistical recording – has produced no little confu-
sion. Some Chinese sources tend to ignore the decrease and instead
extrapolate the former figures; others seem to treat getihu as a residual
category; still others exclude the category of getihu altogether without
making clear where the 'self-employed individuals' have gone.7
Less unambiguous are the data available for the number of people
employed in the siying jingji, the 'private economy', comprising both
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FIGURE 2:  Number of Employees in Private Enterprises (siying qiye),







1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Source: Data made available by the Administration for Industry and Commerce
(Gongshangju) in July 2001.
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 16 • 200234
Heike Holbig
private enterprises (siying qiye) and self-employed individuals' (getihu)
enterprises. Official statistics reported 82.63 million people employed
by siying qiye and getihu at the end of 1999, and 74.77 million one year
later – the decrease being due to the shrinking number of getihu in the
same period.8  A recent report published in the official media gave a
figure of 74.74 million employees in the private economy for the end of
2001.9  Quite differently, an article published in late 2001 in Zhonggong-
dangshi yanjiu puts the total of people working in private enterprises
and self-employed enterprises (jiuye renshu) at 130 million – without
explaining how this high number is derived.10  Concerning the number
of employees in private enterprises (siying qiye), there is also some am-
biguity. According to the Statistical Yearbook, in late 2000, one private
enterprise employed 13.66 persons on average.11  A recent study of the
private sector presented by the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences
(CASS) reports a ratio of 11.38 employees per private enterprise, based
on official registration figures. The same source, however, also cites a
nationwide sampling survey which found that one private enterprise
employed 55 people on average (with more than 90 percent of them
working as low-skilled blue-collar workers in labour-intensive sectors).12
Nobody really seems to know how many people are employed in the
private economy.
Things become even more ambiguous when alternative concepts of
the 'private economy' are taken into account. As a rule, the more ideo-
logically correct a term is, the more statistically vague it becomes. While
the term siying jingji (literally 'privately operated economy') is used
without much reservation in coastal regions, representatives from less
developed regions often prefer the term minying jingji, or 'economy
operated by the people', to avoid the capitalist connotations of the word
si, private.13  Should the minying jingji, at some point in the future, ac-
count for the largest share of GDP, then this would be much more palat-
able than a dominant 'private' (siying) sector.
An ideologically still more cautious notion is the term fei gongyouzhi
jingji, or 'not publicly-owned economy'. It defines the private sector in
a negative manner, including all ownership forms that are not state-
owned, thus comprising not only getihu and siying qiye, but also for-
eign-invested enterprises and a large variety of mixed ownership forms
(among them shareholding companies, 'red hat' and other forms of nomi-
nally collective enterprises which will be discussed below). Although
these latter types are in many cases actually run as private enterprises,
they are not formally acknowledged as belonging to the 'private
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economy' (siying jingi), a term that still is reserved for enterprises with
private capital assets of at least 90 percent. Thus, the term fei gongyouzhi
jingji is ideologically more correct but statistically less transparent. As
parts of the hybrid ownership forms are included, the category pro-
duces much higher figures than the category siying jingji. Already in
1996, the fei gongyouzhi jingji was reported to account for 31 percent of
industrial output value and 53 percent of consumer goods retail sales;
the shares are said to have been growing year by year since then.14  Ac-
cording to recent word-of-mouth information, the figures have risen to
38 and 62 percent respectively in 2001.
The statistical deviations between these various categories reflect a
high degree of ambiguity in the classification of enterprises. Of course,
to some degree the deviations result from the reformulation of statisti-
cal concepts in the official process of diversification of ownership forms.
However, they are also the outcome of strategies used intentionally by
entrepreneurs to cover themselves in a cloak of ambiguity. Various strat-
egies have allowed them to circumvent the discriminations against pri-
vate firms which, to a greater or lesser degree, are still prevailing today,
such as limited access to finance, regulatory restrictions of enterprise
size and operation, and ideological harassments by the party-state.
Among the most popular strategies have been the following:
• Leasing collective firms: Starting from the early 1980s, many ailing
collective enterprises were leased out for private operation. The
entrepreneur paid the collective a fixed rent and operated the firm
as if it were his own private enterprise. Quite often, these
entrepreneurs accumulated large capital assets, thus gradually
reducing the share of the collective assets. In some cases, this led to
the transformation into a solely privately owned firm. Others,
however, preferred to stay in disguise and to continue to operate as
leased collectives.
• 'Wearing a red hat': Particularly in the countryside, many firms that
were actually privately owned were registered as collectively owned
enterprises, among them most township and village enterprises
(TVEs, Chinese: xiangzhen qiye). This prevalent strategy of 'wearing
a red hat' (dai hong maozi) secured them access to land, assets, finance
and markets, as well as tax breaks, favourable contracts, loans on
preferential terms or other forms of subsidies by the local
governments who, in turn, participated in the profits these firms
made. Although local governments started in the middle of the 1990s
to encourage the transformation of these firms into private
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enterprises in order to reduce the budgetary costs, 'red hat'
enterprises still exist in large numbers today, owing to the continuing
advantages of local government involvement.
• 'Roundtripping' of domestic capital: Other domestic entrepreneurs
(re)invested their capital on the mainland through offshore
companies – often existing as mere 'letterbox companies' in Hong
Kong – in order to qualify as foreign investors. As the Chinese
government decided very early in the reform process to offer
significant tax breaks and other advantages to foreign enterprises
(joint ventures or Sino-foreign co-operation enterprises with
domestic state-owned or collective enterprises), the roundtripping
of capital allowed domestic entrepreneurs to partake in these
privileges. With China's accession to the World Trade Organization
in 2001 and the application of the 'national treatment' requirement,
however, privileges to foreign investors should be reduced
considerably over the next years, and with them the incentives for
this kind of roundtripping of domestic capital.
• Co-investing with state and collective firms: Last but not least, many
private entrepreneurs have decided to co-invest with state or
collective firms to create larger mixed-ownership companies, mostly
under the legal form of limited joint-stock or shareholding
companies. Co-investing with public sector actors may have the
advantage of overcoming entry barriers set for private firms in
particular sectors (industries considered vital to the national
economy; industries whose products entail certain public hazards;
and industries using scarce resources – though some restrictions
have been abolished during the past two years). Giving shares to
local government and party cadres or paying them positions as
advisors or board members may also induce other more informal
advantages. A Jiangsu entrepreneur explained in an interview in
Spring 2001 how he had tactically and elegantly distributed the shares
of his firm between his wife, various other family members and key
figures in the local government, not neglecting the local community
authority which obtained 0.5 percent of his company's shares.
15
These strategies demonstrate that the private sector in China is far
from presenting a clear-cut entity. Instead, the regulatory and ideologi-
cal restrictions confronting private entrepreneurship have produced
many incentives to create tactical ambiguity about the firm's owner-
ship form. The more successful private entrepreneurs are, the more they
will be inclined to obscure their categorization as part of the 'private
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sector' and to join the hybrid sector of mixed ownership and manage-
ment forms. To tackle this ambiguity, administrators have started to
give up the increasingly obsolete ownership categories and instead to
lump the various categories together by simply distinguishing between
'small and medium enterprises' (zhong xiao qiye, which are reported to
make up 80-90 percent of Chinese enterprises) and 'large enterprises'
(most of which are state-owned enterprises).16  Although this might be
a more realistic approach, it does not help to clarify the existence of
'true private entrepreneurship' in China.
David Goodman presents an even more disturbing message. In a
study on entrepreneurs conducted during 1996-98 in Shanxi province,
he argues that a complex sector of the economy has emerged between
the state-planned and the privately owned sector which has to be ac-
knowledged as a key feature of provincial economic development. Apart
from the traditional state-run enterprises on the one side and the for-
mal private sector enterprises on the other, a hybrid variety of owner-
ship structures, management systems, registration and incorporation
systems and scales of operation has sprung into existence over the past
decade. Goodman characterizes this hybrid sector as the new 'public
sector' of the economy in the sense that it is relatively open to market
forces and public equity. Among them, he identifies:
• urban enterprises including collectives and share-based companies
established by state-run enterprises and social units, as well as urban
collectives of more pre-reform types;
• rural enterprises including collectives and stock companies
established by townships, villages and rural districts, taking
advantage of the rural sector's preferential economic regulations;
• wholly or partly foreign-funded enterprises, often former private sector
or state-run enterprises which have been transformed into larger
firms through foreign investment;
• so-called 'public sector private enterprises' private enterprises which
have become either collective enterprises through co-operation with
local governments or which have become share-based public
companies, but where the original individual entrepreneur remains
in the senior management position.
17
Looking at the personal backgrounds and risk-taking approaches
among the entrepreneurs and managers of the different types of state-
run, private and 'public sector' enterprises, Goodman concludes:
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Indeed, whilst entrepreneurship is certainly to be found in the private sector of
the economy, the more successful entrepreneurship is located outside the formal
private sector in the new hybrid series of arrangements that exists between the
state-run and private sector.18
With this finding, Goodman indeed shakes the myth of the dyna-
mism of the private economy contrasting with the inertia of the public
economy. According to his study, the most outstanding entrepreneurs
are to be found not in the private sector but in the hybrid public-private
ownership sector. If his observation is true not only for Shanxi province
but for other regions too, then the question arises: Who exactly does the
CCP leadership have in mind when extending the invitation to join the
party? The question becomes all the more tricky when we realize that a
large number of entrepreneurs are already in the party.
Who is Co-opting Whom?
Party Background of Entrepreneurs
Statistics on the percentage of party members among entrepreneurs are
available but rather scattered. Relevant data can be found in the sec-
ondary literature of the past years and in some recent official and semi-
official Chinese publications.
Starting at the bottom end of percentage shares, Andrew Walder found
in a nationwide representative sample conducted in 1996 that 2.6 percent
of those classified as getihu and 14.8 percent of private entrepreneurs (ob-
viously siying qiye) were party members.19  These numbers seem quite low,
but things look different when we take the firms' scale of operation into
account. As various business associations are competing with one another
at the local level to induce the larger and more 'representative' enterprises
to become members, their membership data are quite revealing here. In
particular, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC)
and its provincial and local subsidiaries (also called minjian shanghui or
'non-governmental chambers of commerce'), which have been mandated
by the CCP's United Front department specifically to represent the private
sector enterprises, offer relevant information. Thus, recent ACFIC data re-
veal that the share of CCP members among its own members has already
increased beyond 20 percent. For Anhui province, the provincial chamber
data set for 2001 gives a number of 22 percent of member entrepreneurs
who belong to the party.20  These numbers are confirmed by other recent
Chinese data. The Almanac of Private Economy in China 2000 reported that
19.8 percent (or 4.3 million) of China's private entrepreneurs (obviously
siying qiye) in 1999 were party members.21
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Still higher shares of party members have been reported by Bruce
Dickson, who conducted a survey in eight counties in Zhejiang, Shandong,
Hebei and Hunan in 1997 and 1999 which included, among others, more
than 500 private entrepreneurs. In this survey, which was not conceived as
a random sample but intentionally designed to represent the local eco-
nomic and political elites, Dickson found that almost 40 percent of all re-
sponding entrepreneurs were already CCP members; among them, 24.6
percent were xiahai entrepreneurs, or former officials who had left their
posts and 'plunged into the sea' of the private economy; 13.4 percent were
formal private entrepreneurs who had been co-opted into the CCP as a
result of their business success at some point in the past. Among the mem-
bers of various business associations, he found the highest percentage shares
of CCP members among members of local subsidiaries of the ACFIC;
among them, 34.7 percent had a background as xiahai entrepreneurs and
16.8 percent as private entrepreneurs who were later co-opted into the
CCP. Together, more than half of the responding ACFIC members were
CCP members when the survey was conducted. Also quite strikingly, more
than one-quarter (26.7 percent) of the entrepreneurs in the sample re-
sponded that they wanted to join the party, with about the half of them
having applied for CCP membership already.22
As we understand now, growing numbers of entrepreneurs had de
facto been admitted as party members at the local level by various 'flex-
ible methods' (biantong fangshi) since the 1980s23  – despite the fact that
Article 1 of the CCP statute excludes entrepreneurs as possible CCP
members, and despite a Central Committee document of 1989, which
explicitly banned private entrepreneurs from joining the party (see be-
low). Municipal and county party committees decided high-handedly
to recruit local magnates for pragmatic reasons – be it to participate
more effectively in the wealth of private entrepreneurs, or because they
realized that they could not find enough competent people to run as
village party secretaries if they excluded private entrepreneurs. In or-
der to circumvent the official ban, some private entrepreneurs signed
their firms over to their spouses and applied for party membership as
'employees' of their own firm.24
Percentage shares rise further when we do not focus on the formal
private sector, but look at the various hybrid enterprise forms identi-
fied above. Many of these hybrid enterprises are not run by entrepre-
neurs in the sense of private owner-operators but by managers taking
entrepreneurial risks and contributing with entrepreneurial skills. It
seems to be this wider group of managers and entrepreneurs in the
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hybrid private-public sector which Jiang Zemin had in mind when he
invited into the CCP 'outstanding elements' of the 'new social strata'. In
his speech, he named 'among others, entrepreneurs and technical per-
sonnel employed by scientific and technical enterprises of the non-public
sector, managerial and technical staff employed by foreign-funded en-
terprises, the self-employed, private entrepreneurs, employees in in-
termediaries, and freelance professionals'.25
In the above-mentioned study conducted by David Goodman among
Shanxi business people, he found that 39 percent of owner-operators in
the formal private sector (many of them confirming the stereotype of young
and lowly-educated self-made men) were CCP members. While this share
is already high, he found significantly larger shares among the generally
better educated, and sometimes older, managers and entrepreneurs in what
he identified as the hybrid 'public sector'. Thus, 71 percent of urban enter-
prise managers, 77 percent of rural entrepreneurs, 73 percent of joint ven-
ture managers and 56 percent of 'public sector private entrepreneurs' were
found to be party members. Also, among the mostly young and highly
educated people who were hired by formal private enterprises as manag-
ers due to their specialized professional skills, 66 percent were CCP mem-
bers; all of them had entered the party after 1978.26
The above-mentioned Research Report on Social Strata in Contemporary
China published by CASS in late 2001, which is based on samples from
four different localities in China, offers some revealing and somewhat
surprising information in this context. The study found that the share
of CCP members ranged between 5.2 and 13.7 percent among self-em-
ployed entrepreneurs, and between 0 and 24.4 percent among private
entrepreneurs (with 85.2 percent of private entrepreneurs in Shenzhen
found to be members of the Communist Youth League, the CCP's tradi-
tional recruitment pool). Strikingly, the figures are significantly higher
among managers (jingli renyuan): here, shares of CCP members vary
from 35.7 to 58.8 percent (with a record high of 97.1 percent of manag-
ers in Hefei, Anhui province, found to be present or former members of
the Communist Youth League). Clearly, these percentage shares are
much higher than among industrial workers, where the share of CCP
members ranges between 5.9-13.3 percent, and among agricultural
workers with a range of 4.3-5.2 percent).27
Confronted with these figures, and recollecting the fact that the ratio
of CCP members among the overall populace is less than 5 percent, the
party seems to have attracted managers and entrepreneurs quite suc-
cessfully in the past already. Why, if the new economic elites – or, at
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least, their most outstanding representatives – are already party mem-
bers, should the CCP be interested in 'opening the doors wide' to the
'new social strata' in the future?
Ex-post Legitimization of a Long-standing Fact:
Ideological Strategies
The simple answer to the question why private entrepreneurs are now
officially admitted into the CCP is that the party leadership is attempt-
ing to legitimize what has already been occurring for many years. The
need for an ex-post legitimization might have seemed all the more press-
ing as the ideological revaluation of private entrepreneurs has been in-
creasingly lagging behind the rise of their constitutional status in re-
cent years. Since the start of economic reforms, the most important steps
in the constitutional career of the private sector were the recognition of
individual economic activities as being complementary to the state sec-
tor in 1982, the recognition of the private economy as being a comple-
ment to the socialist public economy in 1988, and the recognition of the
private economy (feigongyouzhi jingji) as an 'important component of
the socialist market economy' (shehuizhuyi shichang jingji de zhongyao
zucheng bufen) plus the provision of constitutional protection of this sec-
tor (Art. 11) in 1999.
Party ideology with its inbuilt safeguards against 'capitalists', 'ex-
ploiters' etc. found it hard to parallel the steady economic and constitu-
tional rise of the private sector, although there were some earlier at-
tempts to bolster the ideological status of private entrepreneurs. Dur-
ing the 13th Party Congress in 1987, Zhao Ziyang, then General-Secre-
tary of the CCP, arranged for the 'Guan Guangmei phenomenon' to be
presented as a showcase to the public. Guan Guangmei was a Liaoning
party member who had taken the lead in leasing an ailing state-owned
enterprise and turning it into a profitable private enterprise. Since then,
private entrepreneurs started to join the party in significant numbers,
provoking an intra-party controversy on the topic of 'exploitation'.28
The Tiananmen protests in 1989 caused a setback; in August of this year,
the Central Committee published its Document 1989 No. 9, which ex-
plicitly banned private entrepreneurs from joining the CCP (Jiang Zemin,
then incoming Party Secretary, supported the ban explicitly at the time).
Starting in the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping helped to step up the political
status of private entrepreneurs. In his theory of the 'three benefits' (sange
liyu), which was also incorporated in the official document of the15th Party
Congress in 1997, he argued that the standard to measure whether an
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ownership system was good or bad was 'whether or not it benefits the
development of productive forces in a socialist society, the improvement
of overall national strength, and the improvement of people's lives.'29  What
he refrained from doing, however, was establishing criteria for representa-
tives from the private sector to qualify as CCP members.
Since early 2000, when Jiang Zemin introduced to the public the so-
called 'requirements of the three representations' (sange daibiao), he has
paved the way for a full ideological emancipation of private entrepre-
neurs. Claiming that the CCP has always to 'represent the development
trend of China's advanced productive forces (1), the orientation of Chi-
na's advanced culture (2), and the fundamental interests of the over-
whelming majority of the people in China (zui guangda renmin de genben
liyi) (3)', he builds upon Deng Xiaoping's 'three benefits'. By putting the
stress of the argument on the development of the 'productive forces'
(1), attention is shifted away from the notion of the 'relations of produc-
tion', which, according to Marxism-Leninism, creates the contradictions
between classes and determines whether a social system is either capi-
talist (exploitative) or socialist (non-exploitative). By actively support-
ing the development of the most 'advanced' production forces, class
struggle becomes irrelevant. The other crucial manipulation of party
ideology is the notion of the 'overwhelming majority of the people' which
the CCP is required to represent. As sensitive readers in China seem to
have understood very early on, this notion – which at first glance sim-
ply seems to reaffirm the CCP's 'mass line' idea – has been intentionally
formulated by Jiang Zemin to include basically all social classes, or, as
the concept of 'class' has been made irrelevant, all social strata.30
Also, obviously in an effort to bolster the image of private entrepre-
neurs who are still widely seen as stingy rustics with a low 'cultural
calibre' (wenhua suzhi), a hierarchy is being created among new social
strata: Situated at the top of this hierarchy are 'entrepreneurs and tech-
nical personnel employed by scientific and technical enterprises of the
non-public sector'. Next come 'managerial and technical staff employed
by foreign-funded enterprises', and only then are the self-made type of
private entrepreneur, the self-employed and others mentioned. This
preoccupation with the higher realms of science and technology (S&T)
seems to resonate with older mystical beliefs in the modernizing power
and scientistic debates of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries in China. This aspect becomes very obvious in a Qiushi article
of November 2001, which describes the 'key contribution' of the new
social strata to the 'building of a socialist economy':
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The broad masses in the new social strata are all engaged in economic operations
to adapt to the objective needs of the development of a socialist market economy.
Private S&T enterprises and their leading technicians with their flexible and
efficient operating forces are engaged in market economy operations, with their
entrepreneurs and technicians applying leading S&T to the development of
new products. … The broad masses in such new social strata are playing a key
role in promoting S&T progress, revitalizing the market, optimizing the
disposition of resources, expanding job avenues, meeting diverse social needs,
and increasing overall social productivity, to promote the development of the
national economy.31
Perhaps the most important element in this legitimization strategy is
the establishment of a set of criteria for admitting entrepreneurs into
the party. Here, the somewhat tautological formula presented in Jiang
Zemin's July speech goes: 'The main criteria to admit a person into the
Party are whether he or she works wholeheartedly for the implementa-
tion of the party's line and programme and meets the requirements for
party membership.'32  This formula obviously was regarded as too vague;
consequently, party organs in the following months set out to clarify
the criteria for party membership. Thus, at the end of August, a much
more specific set of requirements was made public. According to a
Xinhua report, entrepreneurs who wanted to join the party would have
to (1) be law-abiding patriotic citizens, (2) not be guilty of tax-evasion,
(3) reinvest the major part of their profits, and (4) to repay society out of
the wealth they have accumulated.33  Here, the delegation of socio-eco-
nomic responsibilities to the 'new rich' appears as an important ration-
ale behind the move to invite entrepreneurs into the CCP.
Another Qiushi article of November 2001 offers a major discussion of
the criteria of party membership, recommending rules to establish a
person's qualification to join the party. The core passage goes:
The introduction of these principal criteria for recruiting new party members
requires that we be strict in guarding the gates to the party as well as the gates
of ideology. … The two basic requirements of “wholeheartedly struggling for
the implementation of the party's line and programme” and of “meeting the
requirements for party membership” should be handled as one single criterion;
observation of practical  performance, as well as the motive for joining the
party, should be integrated, while one-sidedness should be avoided. … Efforts
should be made to strictly prevent those with impure motives from being
admitted into the party and to avoid using erroneous methods to measure the
new requirements for party membership, such as admission based on economic
strength, on the amount of material donation to society, and on personal
reputation.34
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The main thrust of this argument seems to be to pacify those who
fear that the CCP might admit persons simply for the sake of their wealth
and business success, or persons whose main motive is to abuse the
party's organizational network for their own commercial interests – a
fear that seems quite reasonable. The attempt of ideological justifica-
tion comes very close to more pragmatic motives of admitting entre-
preneurs into the party, which will be discussed below.
The CCP leadership is conscious of the fact that many regard the
party's efforts to justify itself ideologically as highly cynical. As Børge
Bakken points out, the 'three representations' imply the revision of the
Marxist theory of labour and labour value which has formed the core
theory of Marxism and thus lie at the heart of the CCP's identity as the
'vanguard of the working class'.35  The fundamental contradiction be-
tween 'capitalists' and 'proletarian masses', between 'exploiters' and 'ex-
ploited', which has been internalized in China's socialist discourse over
decades, clearly stands in the way of accepting the CCP's new claim to
represent both – labour and capital, workers and entrepreneurs. Party
theorists and social scientists have recently collaborated intensively to
find a formula to reconcile the contradictions, at least rhetorically, and
they have come up recently with a pair of innovatively coined con-
cepts. Workers and peasants are classified as 'basic labourers' (jichu
laodong), while entrepreneurs and managers, the new economic elites,
are coined as 'management labourers' (guanli laodong, or jingying guanli
laodong) with their specific, and in fact, qualitatively more valuable con-
tributions to social and economic progress. The CCP of course, accord-
ing to its traditional mission as the 'vanguard of the working class', has
to represent all workers of the modern economy, basic labourers as well
as management labourers.36
Whether one reads this formula as an enlightened departure from
Marxist dogmatism or as pure cynicism depends on one's own ideo-
logical standpoint. Theoretically, the concept of social(ist) democracy,
which has been debated in Chinese leadership circles for several years,
could offer a framework for a broad representation of all social strata in
the CCP. Yet, acceptance of the new formula should hinge not so much
on the adequate use of ideological labels but on the perception of real
opportunities. Even those social groups who have lost out most in the
reform process would probably not cite the classical Marxist concepts
of exploitation of surplus value to prove the party regime wrong, but
rather demand that they themselves, or their children, get better chances
to participate in the country's economic growth and catch up with the
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new economic elites whatever they are called. Here, I would argue in
line with Torstein Hjellum that the party regime will have a basis of
legitimacy as long as it allows sufficient upward mobility for workers
and peasants to enter the elite ranks.37  However, should the 'three rep-
resentations' aim not so much at opening the party up to the 'new social
strata' but rather, as Børge Bakken suggests, at 'closing the door to groups
further down in the social hierarchy',38  then the CCP's basis of legiti-
macy may indeed crumble rapidly.
Repaying Society: Material Motives
Considering more pragmatic reasons for the CCP to invite entrepre-
neurs, of course, one would first of all think of financial motives. As it is
always advantageous to be in the company of rich people, local party
committees might wish to participate more in the wealth of the new
economic elites and the charisma that radiates from it. More specifi-
cally, while the party-state as a whole will not have any difficulty in
financing its own activities, it should be interested in devolving some
of its social tasks to the newly rich.
Thus, in the first half of 2001, chambers of the All-China Federation of
Industry and Commerce mobilized their members to take part in a public
relations campaign titled 'Two think-ofs' (liang si). With its motto 'Being
wealthy, yet think of the sources [of wealth], enjoying prosperity, yet think
of development', the campaign appealed to private entrepreneurs to be
cognizant of their social responsibility and pay their share for social, edu-
cational, cultural and infrastructure projects in their communities or in
other parts of the country – some in the far West. The so-called 'Glorious
Cause' (guangcai shiye) activities organized by party and mass organiza-
tions and financed by more or less voluntary philanthropists among the
newly rich have, in the meantime, grown into a nationwide network which
involves significant 'private' financial transactions.39
Also, by inducing more private entrepreneurs into the reach of the
party-state, some might hope to improve the tax discipline of the new
economic elites. While tax evasion seems to have been a kind of sport
among private and self-employed entrepreneurs since the 1980s, the
state has tried since the mid-1990s to consolidate the legal basis of tax
collection in the private and the hybrid public-private sector, but with
mixed success. Although private enterprises and individually owned
enterprises together account for more than 20 percent of GDP, they are
reported to contribute less than 10 percent (in some places less than 5
percent) to the local coffers.40
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Connected with these financial aspects is the fear of some that admit-
ting private entrepreneurs into the CCP will strengthen the role of
'money politics', making corruption even more widespread than it al-
ready is.41  As the above-mentioned CASS report complains, there are
already quite a number of private entrepreneurs who regard themselves
as 'special citizens' (teshu gongmin) or are so regarded in their local com-
munities. Thus, they bribe local officials in order to obtain 'political loans'
(zhengzhixing daikuan) and other preferential treatment, and show off
their wealth through conspicuous consumption, which leads to moral
decay. Some of them even link up with triads and other criminal or-
ganizations, exerting a very bad influence on local politics.42  Of course,
with more financial capacity entering the party, to fear that this will
inflate corruption seems a legitimate concern. On the other hand, one
could argue that, compared to the bribery and red-tape practised at
present, corruption will not necessarily increase in the wake of more
entrepreneurs joining the party. As entrepreneurs will not have to 'take
the back entrance' (zou houmen) but will be able, as party members now
themselves, to 'take the front entrance' ('zou qianmen') to realize their
goals, overall corruption may well diminish and 'money politics' may
become more transparent than it used to be in the past.
Co-opting the New Elites: Strategies of Inclusion
Another prevailing argument is that the admission of entrepreneurs
into the CCP is to be interpreted as a strategy to co-opt the new elites: a
strategy of inclusion that allows an organization to add new skills and
resources, enhance its performance, increase political support etc.,
thereby 'avert[ing] threats to its stability or existence'.43  According to
this interpretation, by incorporating private entrepreneurs, the party
mitigates the political pressures from these people. By bestowing on
entrepreneurs the prestige of being part of the ruling party and giving
them a say in decision-making, the CCP ultimately aims at preventing
the emergence of a bourgeois middle class which could form an au-
tonomous political force and thus challenge the CCP's power. In a word,
the co-optation of new economic elites is designed to pre-empt a poten-
tial political threat which a future middle class or bourgeoisie could
pose to the CCP's one-party dominance.44
This argument is used by CCP ideologues, too, whose mission is to
promote the admission of the new 'outstanding elements'. Thus, some
of them warn that if the party does not reach out to the new elites, they
could, at some point in the future, form an organized oppositional force
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challenging the party's authority. As one article published in late 2001
in Zhonggongdangshi yanjiu argued, the CCP has to learn a lesson from
the worldwide decay of communism: The reason why the power of the
Soviet Union's and other countries' communist regimes collapsed was
the fact that they had failed to adapt their social base in accordance
with the structural change of the social strata, thus 'losing the support
of the youth, particularly of young entrepreneurs active in the new
economy and of young intellectuals'. To prevent a collapse of power
similar to that of the Soviet Union, the CCP should follow the trend of
the more successful socialist democratic parties worldwide and adapt
its social base to absorb outstanding elements from the newly emerg-
ing middle strata (xinxing zhongjian jieceng), among them entrepreneurs,
white-collar workers and intellectuals. Should the party fail to do so,
the author warns, these people 'will necessarily develop this or that
idea' (shibi hui chancheng zheyang nayang de xiangfa), some will join one
of the democratic parties, or even join forces with other parties to form
an opposition party (chengwei yige fanduipai)'.45
Now, we should ask ourselves how realistic such a scenario is in-
deed. More specifically, is there really something like a new middle
class in the making, with an independent bourgeois mindset and politi-
cal ambitions of its own, which the party has to prevent from taking
over its power? As we have seen above, there are large differences in
the social, educational and professional backgrounds of the various
groups of entrepreneurs and managers, with the sidewalk shoeshine
getihu at one extreme, and the US-trained manager of a modern 'S&T'
enterprise, investment corporation or foreign-invested firm at the other.
Also, the oft-cited discrimination against the private economy does not
apply uniformly across the various ownership and management forms.
While some enterprises may find it hard to access bank credit, land or
raw materials, others may have found a viable mode of symbiosis with
the local authorities which secures them privileged access to finance
and other resources as well as political insurance. With the enormous
differences in mind, it still seems hard to imagine the emergence of a
homogeneous social group pursuing a collective set of strategies in a
consistent manner, at least for the time being. As Bruce Dickson main-
tains: 'So far, China's private entrepreneurs have not asserted themselves
as an organized or coherent interest group.'46
Yet, according to the CASS report, a social identity of private entre-
preneurs is in the making. Although they do not yet form a political
force of their own, private entrepreneurs are found to gradually de-
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velop a sense of common bonds and belonging. What binds them to-
gether is, after decades of repeated class struggle, the desire to regain
full social and political acceptance as well as legal protection of their
properties and activities. Only if they can trust that the severe ideologi-
cal discrimination against 'capitalists' in the past will not be repeated in
the future, the report argues, will entrepreneurs be ready to reinvest
substantial parts of their profits. Also, the study finds, while the major-
ity of entrepreneurs are restricting their activities to speaking business
(zai shang yan shang), aiming just to protect or promote their individual
status, a minority has become politically active, articulating specific
political demands. Thus, for example, they lobby for a positive busi-
ness environment and a stable implementation of economic policies,
for the enhancement of their social and political status (e.g. for the right
to be eligible as 'model workers'), for legal guarantees and for more
direct participation in the party-state's decision-making process.47
If these findings are true, a rationale might indeed have taken shape in
CCP leadership circles to include the more active and articulate elements
among the new social strata into the party rather than risk their political
defection. However, we have to ask ourselves again whether the new policy
of admitting entrepreneurs into the party does indeed make a difference
here. Inclusionary politics have been practised by the party-state in the
past. Various mechanisms of inclusion have existed for a long time, such
as 'arranging' (anpai) for entrepreneurs to serve as delegates to people's
congresses or the political consultative congresses at all administrative lev-
els, to let them articulate their interests via the ACFIC and its local subsidi-
aries, or via other associations and mass organizations, etc. Strikingly, many
of these traditionally 'arranged' political representatives of the private
economy are already CCP members – which can be easily explained by
the fact that it is always the most prestigious entrepreneurs who are se-
lected for 'political' posts. As Bruce Dickson found in his sample of eight
counties, 78 percent of private entrepreneurs in people's congresses and 61
percent in political consultative congresses were party members.48  There-
fore one could argue that the strategy of co-optation has been applied quite
successfully already.
Given such a high degree of overlapping political roles among pri-
vate entrepreneurs, the question arises whether the admission of more
entrepreneurs into the CCP might not merely lead to a duplication of
leverage of those groups who have already been politically active in the
past. Of course, the new policy would make a difference if it were to
allow representatives of the private sector to take over politically influ-
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ential party or government posts. Otherwise, bestowing the most pres-
tigious private entrepreneurs with CCP membership, for them could
just mean another honorary ornament without much significance for
political participation. Much more detailed information will be needed
to find out more about the reality of inclusionary politics vis-à-vis the
private sector.
Stretching the CCP Grassroots: Organizational Motives
Another – more tangible and perhaps more decisive – motive for invit-
ing private entrepreneurs into the CCP may be the steady decline of the
party's organizational influence in the economy which has been recorded
over the past two decades. In the traditional state-owned sector the party
was not only omnipresent but in most cases dominant in the firms'
management. With the growth of the private and hybrid sectors, how-
ever, the party's presence has been reduced quite dramatically. While the
total number of party members has developed proportionally with the
increase of population (June 2002: 66.4 million members, which equals
about 5 percent of the population), the CCP's organizational reach has been
shrinking significantly in the growing private sector of the economy. As
the establishment of CCP grassroots organizations has not been obliga-
tory here, the mobilizational capacity of the party seem to have been se-
verely reduced in this sector. With it, the party has, over the years, been cut
off from access to ever larger parts of the country's workforce.
To tackle this problem, Jiang Zemin announced in May 2000 that party
grassroots organizations should be established in those firms of the non-
public economy where 'conditions were ripe'.49  According to the plans of
the CCP's Organization Department, enterprises with at least three party
members among their employees were expected to establish a CCP grass-
roots organization (jiceng zuzhi), those with more than three but less than
50 party members should form a regular party branch (dang zhibu), and
those with more than 50 party members should establish a general branch
(zong zhibu). If 'conditions were not ripe yet', trade unions, youth leagues
and other mass organizations' branches should be set up first to pave the
way for the later establishment of party cells in private firms.50
According to an article published in Zhonggongdangshi yanjiu in the
autumn of 2001, among the 1.76 million private enterprises registered
in late 2000, 86 percent had no party members among their employees
at all, and only 0.9 percent had established CCP grassroots organiza-
tions in their firms. The author lists various reasons for this dire situa-
tion: First of all, it is hard for party organizations in private enterprises
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to play their proper role. Although some firms have established party
cells, they did so only to get access to party channels for the recruitment
of qualified personnel; some party cells were 'dependent on the entre-
preneur' (yifu yu qiyezhu) – obviously a euphemism for being an instru-
ment of the entrepreneur – while others existed on paper only.51
The case of Zhang Ruimin, director of the famous Hai'er joint stock
company, is a case in point: When asked by a foreign journalist about
who was the party secretary in his company, and whether there weren't
any contradictions between the party's goals and the shareholders' in-
terests, Zhang replied: 'Well, the party secretary, that's me … there won't
ever arise any contradictions, 'cause how can I be in contradiction with
myself?'52  Our own interviews with private and 'red-hat' (hongmao) en-
trepreneurs in Jiangsu in May 2001 have revealed that this type of
entrepreneur-cum-party secretary has indeed become quite widespread
in recent years.53  Thus, often, where there are party cells, they seem to
be instrumentalized as a mere management tool by the laoban, the 'boss'.
In a sense, one can recognize here a strategy of 'counter co-optation'
where the entrepreneur co-opts the party in order to safeguard the or-
ganizational stability of his firm.
The Zhonggongdangshi yanjiu article offers another reason for the trou-
bles of establishing party cells in private firms, which is the 'incomplete
ideological understanding' (sixiang renshi bu daowei) on the side of some
party members. For example, some believe (wrongly, of course) that
the principle of striving for profits is fundamentally incompatible with
the overall goals of the party, and therefore lack self-confidence to do a
good party-building job. Others believe that although private entrepre-
neurs have experienced a rapid development, they still hold a marginal
position in social respects. From this perspective therefore, whether party
organizations are active there or not does not really matter so much.
Still others believe (again, wrongly) that private entrepreneurs only strive
for economic success and do not care at all about the development of
party cells.
On the side of the private entrepreneurs, the article finds the follow-
ing 'one-sided opinions' which can be explained by their 'different per-
sonal backgrounds and knowledge levels': First, some entrepreneurs
fear that party grassroots organizations, once they are established in
their firm, could 'use their political influence to interfere with the eco-
nomic decision-making and disturb the regular production order of the
firm, thus impairing the profit goals'. Second, some believe that there
are too many non-economic activities being initiated by grassroots or-
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ganizations, increasing the financial burden and driving up the firm's
expenditures. Third, some associate the party mainly with lavish ban-
quets, red-tape and corruption in general and therefore 'have no trust
in the party' (dui dang mei you xinrengan) – a peculiar reversal of ortho-
dox party members' fear that admitting private entrepreneurs into the
CCP could increase corruption.54
As these observations demonstrate, the author is quite sensitive to
the potential barriers hindering the establishment of party grassroots
organizations in private enterprises. The precautions found on the side
of entrepreneurs seem all the more realistic as the prescribed tasks of
party organizations in private firms comprise not only ideological edu-
cation and the protection and mediation of workers' interests, but also
participation in the firm's decision-making on crucial production and
operation matters. The article emphasizes over and over again that the
party organizations, in order to win the trust of the entrepreneurs, should
refrain from old-style 'commandism', bureaucratic interference and com-
pulsion. Rather, they should play a participatory role by making sug-
gestions and giving advice, co-operating with the management to en-
sure a healthy development of the firm. The relation between party or-
ganization and entrepreneur should not be 'hierarchical' (dengji) or 'an-
tagonistic' (duili), but rather one of 'compatibility' (xiangrong) – what-
ever this might signify in terms of power relations.
What we find in this description is a potential source of growing prob-
lems, tensions and contradictions between the laoban and party repre-
sentatives inside private enterprises. As the article states explicitly, if
the entrepreneur is not willing to recruit party members as employees,
he cannot be forced to do so. Thus, to attain the goal of establishing party
cells and increase the CCP's organizational presence in private companies,
it is crucial to win the sympathy of the entrepreneurs at first hand.
The nexus between the inclusion of entrepreneurs and the mobiliza-
tion of private sector's workforce outlined seems very important and
might have significantly motivated Jiang Zemin's July speech: While
the co-optation of private entrepreneurs into the CCP is often seen to
work at the expense of the traditional focus of party-building on work-
ers and peasants,55  one could also make the reverse argument: In line
with the logic just presented, co-optation of the new elites is not so much
an end in itself, but rather a necessary precondition for ensuring the
continued success of traditional party-building measures among the
working masses. As an ever larger share of the country's workers is and
will be employed by the private or hybrid sector of the economy, the
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CCP needs to secure its foothold in these sectors in order to gain access
to these parts of the workforce. In this sense, co-opting the new 'man-
agement labourers' can be seen as the best and only strategy for the
party to reach out to the masses of the 'basic labourers' who otherwise
would go astray. Paradoxical though it may sound, in order to uphold
its nature as the 'vanguard of the working class', the CCP might have
decided to tolerate 'capitalists' within its own ranks.
Conclusion: What We Do Not Know
Concluding this paper, it would be a very satisfying thing to sum up
the results and use them to philosophize about the outlook for the par-
ty's future development. Suitable topics for discussion might include:
the possible evolution of the CCP into a 'people's party' or whatever
other labels one might invent; the change in the party's identity and the
ideological and psychological reverberations of this change; the future
political role of entrepreneurs and other new economic elites; or the
prospects for democracy inside and outside the party. However, for the
time being, it seems premature to tackle these 'big questions' when our
knowledge of the 'small questions' remains insufficient. Thus, as I hope
to have shown, some assumptions concerning basic concepts and cat-
egories of the 'private sector', as well as motives and strategies of the
party, should be (re-)tested on the microscopic level before drawing
macropolitical conclusions. According to my understanding, concep-
tual vagueness or insufficient knowledge prevails regarding the follow-
ing aspects:
• The concepts of 'private sector', 'private entrepreneur' etc. are not
such clear notions in Chinese discourse as the English-language
media coverage seems to suggest. This is not only due to statistical
inconsistencies, but, more importantly, to inbuilt incentives for actors
in the Chinese political economy to disguise what is 'private'.
Looking only at the formal private sector (getihu and siying qiye)
seems substantially to misrepresent the dynamics of entrepreneurial
activities. Therefore, it would be highly desirable to get more
concrete insights into the hybrid public-private sectors of the
economy, particularly at the local level, and to understand better
which among the various types of entrepreneur-managers the CCP
in fact wishes to co-opt.
• To speak of 'private entrepreneurs' as a homogeneous group,
suggesting that they have similar backgrounds and pursue
consistent interests and strategies, seems to ignore the large
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divergencies in personal, educational and occupational backgrounds
of entrepreneurs as well as in their attitudes and behaviour.
Therefore, the notion of an emerging 'middle class' seems somewhat
premature, particularly if it is ascribed the mythical role of a
harbinger of pluralist democracy. Before lumping everybody
together to form a 'bourgeoisie with Chinese characteristics', it seems
more promising to analyse in more detail the variations in backgrounds,
interests and strategies among the different groups of entrepreneurs
and managers active in present-day China. Some recent studies of social
scientists inside and outside China have done pioneering work in this
field which can form a fundament for further research.
• Analysing the CCP's strategies of inclusion, we should take into
account the various modes of co-optation and organizational linkage
which exist inside and outside the party (as scholars such as Bruce
Dickson, Thomas Heberer, Kellee Tsai, Zheng Yongnian and others
have already been doing). To remind ourselves, various formal
channels of political representation of entrepreneurial interests have
already been in existence for many years, such as serving as
delegates in people's congresses and political consultative
congresses, or lobbying through business associations and mass
organizations. Realizing that most entrepreneurs who have been
politically active via these channels are already CCP members, the
question arises how the admission of more entrepreneurs into the
party will impact on those formal channels of participation. Will
party membership of new groups of entrepreneurs indeed increase
their leverage, or will it merely duplicate existing structures of
political participation?
• Besides the formal channels, there are many informal ways of
representating group interests, which entrepreneurs seem to have
found effective in the past. Among them are, of course, various time-
honoured networking (guanxi) strategies, but also some innovative
methods. The emergence of the 'private entrepreneur-cum-party
secretary model' is but one example of what I would call a 'counter
co-optation' strategy pursued by entrepreneurs to cope with the
CCP's co-optation strategy. If we want to understand the motives
and strategies behind the party's attitude toward entrepreneurs, we
should analyse the entrepreneurs' motives and strategies as well.
Hopefully in the wake of the 16th Party Congress, when more
entrepreneurs might be admitted into the CCP, more detailed
information will become available about their role in the game.
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